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"If we were such that we could in a crisis dissociate ourselves from one
commitment because it clashed with another, we would be less good.




Modem choice-of-law analysis is heavily indebted to Brainerd Currie's
interest analysis. Currie argued that conflicts cases should be resolved
by first determining whether more than one state has a real interest in
applying its law to adjudicate the dispute. If the case poses a "false con-
flict," the result is easy-apply the law of the only interested state. If the
case poses a "true conflict," then, somewhat regretfully in Currie's view,
the proper thing to do is to apply forum law.
2
The majority of courts appear to accept the first part of Currie's
analysis. Most courts that use modem conflicts analysis are receptive to
the idea that it is useful to start by asking whether the case poses a false
conflict. However, courts uniformly appear to reject the second part of
Currie's analysis-at least if we focus on the rhetoric of the judges who
decide conflicts cases.
I want to argue that this arrangement is exactly backwards. Con-
trary to the prevailing view of most interest analysts, I believe that the
search for false conflicts is fundamentally misguided. On the other
hand, recognition of a rebuttable presumption that forum law applies
would be descriptively accurate, normatively desirable, and of practical
utility. There are, however, important exceptions to this principle; the
presumption can and should be overcome in identifiable cases. More-
over, other formulations of conflicts law might achieve the same goals by
means other than a rebuttable forum law presumption.
* Professor of Law, Boston University. Thanks and affection go to Martha
Minow, Larry Kramer, and Lea Brilmayer. © 1991, Joseph William Singer.
1. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 50 (1986).
2. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963).
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This article explains (1) what is useful about a rebuttable presump-
tion that forum law applies; and (2) what is wrong with false conflicts
analysis. In explaining what is wrong with false conflicts analysis, partic-
ular attention is paid to the ways in which interest analysis is misused by
the courts and to why those misuses are predictable consequences of
false conflicts analysis. The article concludes by briefly exploring a typi-
cal conflicts case with a form of policy analysis that does not rely on the
search for false conflicts.
Courts need to face the real conflicts embodied in choice-of-law
cases. These are hard cases which implicate multiple and conflicting
principles.3 As Martha Nussbaum argues, "An honest effort to do jus-
tice to all aspects of a hard case, seeing and feeling it in all its conflicting
many-sidedness, could enrich future deliberative efforts." '4 Better deci-
sions will result if courts see conflicts cases as the conflicts they really
are.
I. Why a Rebuttable Forum Law Presumption Is Useful
A presumption that forum law applies is desirable for a variety of rea-
sons. First, a rebuttable forum law presumption accords with the actual
practice of courts in deciding choice-of-law cases. Second, it properly
helps focus initial attention on the substantive policies underlying the
rules or areas of law in question. Third, a rebuttable forum law pre-
sumption is compatible with the multistate goal of promoting comity or
toleration and respect for diversity among separate normative and polit-
ical communities if, as I advocate, the presumption is combined with
criteria for overcoming the presumption and identification of paradig-
matic circumstances under which it may be appropriate to defer to for-
eign law.
Two preliminary points are important to mention. First, this article
will discuss cases that raise what I call "real conflicts" and which have
traditionally been called "true conflicts." 5 I do not advocate applying
forum law to a case that has no significant contacts with the forum.
Rather, I address cases in which contacts with the forum are such that it
is plausible to argue that the forum has a real interest in applying its law
to adjudicate the legal relationship between the parties.
Second, I do not advocate that conflicts cases presenting real con-
flicts be resolved automatically by application of forum law. Nor do I
3. See generally STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE (1990); CHARLES
LARMORE, PATRNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); JAMES WALLACE, MORAL RELE-
VANCE AND MORAL CONFLICT (1988).
4. M. NuSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 45.
5. The term "real conflict" is used because relatively few of the cases tradition-
ally designated "false conflicts" by courts and scholars are such. I see true conflicts
in many cases where others see false conflicts. I therefore use the term real conflict
to remind the reader that I have in mind a more expansive definition of state interests
than most interest analysts and consider that most contested conflicts cases raising
interesting choice-of-law issues cannot reasonably be characterized as false conflicts.
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argue that courts always apply forum law to resolve real conflicts.
Rather, I emphasize that, more often than not, contested conflicts cases
in the real world are resolved by application of forum law. At the same
time, many cases presenting real conflicts are not resolved by applica-
tion of forum law, and it may be both possible and desirable to construct
choice-of-law principles that promote uniform and predictable results
for this subset of conflicts cases.
A. A Rebuttable Forum Presumption Accords with Judicial Practice
As Louise Weinberg, 6 Robert Sedler,7 Herma Hill Kay, 8 and Michael
Solimine9 have long reminded us, although judges may not admit it in
their opinions, 10 a preference for forum law-which ordinarily benefits
the plaintiff-describes the results actually reached by most courts in a
system without federal choice-of-law rules." The majority of cases
presenting real conflicts are resolved by application of forum law. This
does not mean that courts always apply forum law; there are identifiable
situations in which the courts tend to apply foreign law.
The fact that judges apply forum law in many conflicts cases is not,
by itself, a sufficient reason to adopt forum law as the presumptively
applicable law. However, the courts' partial preference for forum law is
not the result of parochial blindness to the values of federalism. On the
contrary, there are good reasons why courts ordinarily apply forum law
when they can in multistate cases. At the same time, identifiable reasons
exist that legitimately prompt courts to depart from using forum law in
particular classes of cases. All other things being equal, a choice-of-law
approach that courts are more likely to adopt is preferable to one likely
to be systematically subverted through the manipulation of ambiguous
concepts or the creation of escape devices. An honest recognition of the
inclination to resolve real conflicts by applying forum law therefore has
the merit of articulating the values underlying the "law in action." By
honestly describing the actual legal practice in the courts, the forum pre-
sumption may increase predictability for citizens trying to determine
6. Louise Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REv. 595
(1984).
7. Robert Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A
Response to the New Critics, 34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983).
8. Henna Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, extracted
from 215 ACADEMIE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL: RECUEIL DES COURS [ACADEMY OF
INT'L LAW: COLLECTED SOURCES] (1989-111).
9. Michael Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L.
REV. 49 (1989).
10. Judges may fail to acknowledge the forum law presumption because they
unfortunately have been convinced by those legal scholars who view such a presump-
tion as parochial and discriminatory.
11. Whether federal choice-of-law rules are preferable to state choice-of-law rules
is a complicated question. Compare Daniel Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power
& the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 291 (1990) (arguing for federal choice-of-law rules)
with Robert Sedler & Aaron Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass Tort
Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MAR9. L. REV. 76 (1989) (arguing against federal
choice-of-law rules).
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what their legal rights are. It may also encourage clear thinking in
choice-of-law analysis by better articulating the values underlying the
intuitions of the judges charged with deciding these difficult cases. Such
a procedure can better explain situations in which courts are and are not
willing to defer to foreign law.
It is important to recognize that the courts appear to have uniformly
rejected explicitly adopting the principle of applying forum law to adju-
dicate what they see as real conflicts. 12 Moreover, courts that have
adopted modem conflicts analysis do not always resolve real conflicts by
applying forum law.13 Several conclusions may be drawn from this state
of affairs. A rigid rule mandating application of forum law whenever the
forum has a real interest in applying its law, as advocated by Robert
Sedler,' 4 is unlikely to be adopted by the courts. This reluctance to
adopt a rigid forum law preference coexists, as Sedler has shown, with
an actual preference for forum law in the majority of cases presenting
contested choice-of-law issues. 15 This suggests that courts are con-
cerned not only about the results they reach, but also the reasoning pro-
cess by which those results are reached. Additionally, courts are
uncomfortable with a reasoning process that fails to include considera-
tion of the relative interests of the parties and the states involved.
One way to respond to this situation is to attempt to identify choice-
of-law principles that accurately describe the situations in which courts
are willing to defer to the law of another state.' 6 However, it is not
likely that we will be able in the near future to construct principles that
will govern all kinds of cases. For this reason, it is crucial to have a
fallback position when no principle applies to govern the case. Some
scholars have suggested that we adopt territorial rules, such as the place
of the injury, as the fallback position. 17 Such a response is fundamen-
12. Kentucky and Michigan have adopted approaches to answering choice-of-law
questions which choose forum law if the case has any significant contacts with the
forum. Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Olmstead v. Anderson, 400
N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 1987). This test eschews interest analysis entirely, with one
important exception-the choice must comply with constitutional constraints under
the full faith and credit clause and the due process clause. The Constitution requires
that a state "have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary or fundamentally
unfair." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
13. See, e.g., Eger v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 110 NJ. 133, 539 A.2d 1213
(1988); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 65 N.Y.2d 189, 490 N.E.2d 679, 491
N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
14. Robert Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and
a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 131, 227 (1977).
15. Sedler, supra note 7, at 604-05, 611; Solimine, supra note 9, at 81-92.
16. See, e.g., DAVID CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS (1965); Larry Kramer,
Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990); RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (3d ed. 1986).
17. John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the States Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); Harold Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983).
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tally misguided because it institutionalizes arbitrariness. 18 Rather, the
falback position for real conflicts should be forum law. The forum
should apply its own law when it has a real interest in doing so unless (1)
application of forum law unfairly surprises one of the parties or other-
wise violates their rights to the advantage of another state's law, or (2)
application of forum law would illegitimately interfere with the ability of
another political community to govern relationships centered there.19
Another way to conceptualize this proposal is to suggest adopting a
rebuttable presumption that forum law applies. This formulation simi-
larly requires identifying both criteria for determining when it is appro-
priate for the presumption to be overcome and paradigmatic
circumstances in which it may be appropriate to defer to foreign law.
Because a rebuttable forum law presumption is compatible with judges'
intuitions of their proper role in conflicts cases, it is more likely to be
adopted. The greater likelihood of adoption means that it better articu-
lates the actual values underlying choice-of-law decisions.
B. A Forum Law Presumption Properly Focuses Attention on
Substantive Policies
A forum law presumption, or fallback position, would not only better
cohere with the current practice of courts than retreating to arbitrary
territorial rules, but would be normatively desirable as well. A rebutta-
ble forum law presumption correctly forces judges to confront the real
conflicts underlying substantive and multistate policy in each case. Ter-
ritorial rules are arbitrary because they do not require analysis of such
policies. Similarly, a forum law presumption is appropriate only if the
courts supplement it with consideration of such policies. The analysis
must include consideration of the interests of the losing party and the
ability of the state whose law is not applied to govern relationships cen-
tered there. The combination of choice-of-law principles with a princi-
ple of applying forum law when no such principles apply will constitute a
workable system for modem interest analysis by the courts.
A forum law presumption properly focuses the courts' initial atten-
tion on the substantive policies and goals underlying the legal rules in
question. Forum law is preferred, after all, because the forum state is
likely to view it as the best way to resolve the dispute, either because the
law is viewed as fair or because it promotes the general welfare. For this
reason, courts should begin their analysis of choice-of-law cases in the
same way they analyze purely domestic cases-by determining which
legal principle and result best accord with both justice and wise social
policy.2
0
Conflicts cases provide an unusually powerful impetus for the
forum court to reexamine the wisdom and justice of the policies under-
18. Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U.L. REv. 731
(1990); Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1989).
19. Singer, Real Conflicts, supra note 18, at 90-92.
20. Id. at 79-83.
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lying forum law. A conflicts case involving harm caused by a dangerous
product, for example, involves two states' conflicting policies about how
to handle products liability cases. The conflict arises because of the dif-
ferent tort policies, and because the parties or the events have sufficient
contacts with each state to raise legitimate expectations in each state of
either a right to protection or legitimate regulatory interests. A rebutta-
ble forum law presumption-while requiring the forum to articulate the
policies underlying forum law-encourages the forum to articulate why
forum policy is better than the policy of the competing jurisdiction. In
so doing, the forum court will better understand what it would be giving
up if it defers to the law of the other state. At the same time, precisely
because it is a conflicts case, the court has a duty to face, and to try to
understand, why the other jurisdiction disagrees with the forum as to
the better tort policy.
As Professor Weinberg has argued, this process of comparing the
substantive policies of the affected states may lead the forum court to
revise its conception of which legal rule better accords with the forum's
notions of justice and utility.2 1 If the forum court determines that the
foreign law is better than its own law, then the forum should change its
law if it can. If courts follow this approach, conflicts cases could serve as
a major impetus for reexamination and modernization of the law. By
examining the reasons why other states have chosen different policies
and by comparing those reasons to the arguments underlying forum
law, the forum will develop a more sophisticated understanding of those
areas of law that are in flux or about which there is substantial disagree-
ment among the states and perhaps even the populace generally.
If the forum court cannot change what it perceives as the "worse"
forum law-either because it is embodied in a statute or a recent higher
court opinion-then the initial focus on substantive policy will have the
benefit of focusing the court's attention on the real conflicts posed in
multistate cases. The court will have to wrestle with whether it is appro-
priate to confine its own "worse" forum law to purely domestic cases-
thereby limiting the externalities of unjust or unwise social policies on
other jurisdictions 2 2 -or whether failing to apply forum law would
unjustly discriminate against either party by denying them the protec-
tion of forum law under circumstances that cannot reasonably be distin-
guished from cases in which forum law would be applied. 23
On the other hand, if the forum court concludes that forum law is
better than the foreign law, the court still has an obligation to address
multistate policy. The question here is whether the forum court should
21. Weinberg, supra note 6, at 597.
22. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal.3d 157, 583 P.2d
72, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978) (failing to apply California law partly on the grounds
that it was archaic).
23. See Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964) (O'Connell,J., spe-
cially concurring) (arguing that it would be discriminatory to protect families whose
members wasted money inside Oregon but not families whose members wasted
money outside Oregon).
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forego what it views as the better law and enforce a result it believes is
either unjust or promotes socially destructive behavior. It might do so
for two reasons. First, it might defer to the right of one of the parties to
claim the protection of another state's law. Second, it might defer to
another state's ability to constitute itself as a normative and political
community by applying state policies to relationships centered there.24
By starting with a presumption that forum law applies, attention is
focused on the right issues, namely (1) the best tort or contract policy as
a matter of substantive law, and (2) how to resolve conflicts between
substantive justice as the forum sees it (i.e., applying the better forum
law) and tolerance (i.e., deference to the law of another political and
normative community that is vitally interested in governing the relation-
ship between the parties and the conduct at issue).
C. A Rebuttable Forum Law Presumption Accords with Multistate
Policy
A rebuttable forum law presumption can be expressed in two different
ways. On one hand, it consists of a combination of choice-of-law princi-
ples with a fallback position of forum law applicable to cases that do not
come under any of the general principles. On the other hand, it can be
described as a presumption that forum law applies which can be over-
come if the case falls within the special situations in which the forum
should, in all justice, give up its otherwise applicable law in deference to
the authority of the political community in another state. The presump-
tion therefore represents a compromise between the extremes of always
applying forum law to adjudicate real conflicts and never resorting to
forum law as a deciding factor.
The presumption that forum law applies rests on the assumption
that the forum court should ordinarily resolve disputes so as to further
the forum's conception of justice and wise social policy. The forum
court should, however, defer to foreign law when doing so would pro-
tect the justified expectations of persons who reasonably relied on the
law of another state, who would be unfairly surprised by application of
forum law, or who would otherwise have a right to claim protection of
the law of the other state. The forum court should also defer to foreign
law when application of forum law would unduly interfere with the abil-
ity of another state to constitute itself as a normative and political com-
munity by preventing it from regulating relationships centered there. I
believe that these exceptions apply in a relatively narrow range of cases.
Nonetheless, it is crucial in each case for the forum to face any conflict
that may arise between furthering its substantive policies and the multi-
state policies embodied in these exceptions.
24. See Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1961) (refusing to apply forum law to invalidate an oral agreement made in Nevada
by a Nevada resident which was enforceable at the time made under Nevada law).
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Several scholars have advocated an even stronger forum law prefer-
ence than that urged here. They argue that forum law should generally
be applied if the forum has a real interest in applying its law unless
application of forum law would so unfairly surprise one of the parties as
to constitute an unconstitutional denial of due process. 25 Forum law
should constitute the fallback position, but even when it would not be
unconstitutional to apply forum law, the forum court should, as a com-
mon law matter, wrestle with whether application of forum law wrongly
violates the rights of one party or unduly interferes with the ability of
another state to govern relations centered there.
For several reasons, a preference for forum law in cases that present
real conflicts does not violate multistate norms of toleration or comity.
First, cases involving real conflicts necessarily involve the sacrifice of
one state's interests at the expense of another state's interests. Coase
taught us to see all legal disputes in this light.26 Application of either
state's law will create externalities for the other state.
Second, as Professor Herma Hill Kay has recently argued in her
Hague Lectures, the principle of toleration or respect for diversity
among the laws of different states applies not only when the forum court
defers to the law of another state, but when it applies forum law with
confidence that an interested foreign jurisdiction would understand the
reasons why the forum claims a legitimate interest in governing the
rights of the parties to the suit.
2 7
Third, application of forum law is not inherently parochial or dis-
criminatory. 28 In many cases, application of forum law will benefit a
non-resident, as when a foreign tort or contract plaintiff sues a resident
defendant and claims that the higher standard of care imposed by forum
law applies to regulate the defendant's conduct there.29 At the same
time, the forum should address the question of whether application of
forum law will wrongly discriminate against one of the parties by deny-
25. B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 117-21; Kay, supra note 8, at 149-67; Sedler, supra
note 7, at 593; Sedler, supra note 14, at 227; Weinberg, supra note 6, at 595. The
difference may be less than it appears on the surface because these scholars use more
expansive definitions of false conflicts which may lead them to defer to foreign law in
appropriate circumstances by arguing that the forum has no real interest in applying
its law to the case. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 14, at 222-23.
26. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960).
27. Kay, supra note 8, at 173-75.
28. I use "inherently" because a rigid forum preference might be used in a way
that was illegitimately parochial or discriminatory. For this reason, I argue for a
rebuttable presumption that forum law applies, rather than a rigid rule to that effect.
29. See, e.g., Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622,473 N.E.2d 662
(1985) (applying forum law to enforce a contractual promise made by a Massachu-
setts resident to a New York resident even though the obligation would not have
been enforceable in a New York court because the New York plaintiff did not comply
with the New York statute of frauds); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash.2d
577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976) (applying forum law to impose full tort liability on a Wash-
ington defendant who had sold a product to a customer in Kansas who was injured by
the product, despite the fact that Kansas limited liability for wrongful death).
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ing the benefits of foreign law which would be accorded to similarly situ-
ated parties in the foreign state.
Fourth, in certain cases a rebuttable presumption that forum law
applies may have the desirable effect of expanding the range of applica-
tion of better law in the multistate cases to which it applies; it therefore
may decrease the range of application of aberrational, unjust, or inferior
state laws. Professor Weinberg has argued, for example, that applica-
tion of forum law furthers generally desirable social policies of provid-
ing compensation for injured victims, deterring wrongful conduct, and
protecting justified expectations based on contract. To the extent that
these policies are wise and just and alternative policies represent rela-
tively narrow exceptions to these principles, a forum law presumption
may have the felicitous consequence of confining aberrational or minor-
ity policies to domestic cases within those states that choose to pursue
such policies. On the other hand, rigid application of forum law may
have the opposite effect of encouraging a race to the bottom among the
states. It is therefore necessary to identify the circumstances in which
the forum law presumption should be overcome.
D. Limits to the Forum Law Preference
A rigid, forum law preference may have significant undesirable effects.
It is important to remember that a forum law preference may create a
race to the courthouse by both parties. It is not at all clear that the
plaintiff will be the hapless tort victim or the one whose contract has
been wrongly breached. Because courts in recent years have been more
likely to apply forum law in multistate cases, this has provided an impe-
tus for potential defendants to bring declaratory judgment actions in
defendant-protecting jurisdictions. A rigid forum law presumption
would thus allow the more sophisticated and wealthier parties to over-
whelm potential adversaries by racing to the courthouse before them.
For this reason, it is important in every case to examine whether fairness
or multistate policy would justify denying the plaintiff the benefits of
forum law.
In some cases, a rigid forum law preference may generate a process
that resembles a "'race to the bottom" among the states on particular
social and legal issues. Litigation involving national companies gives
plaintiffs wide discretion in choosing the forum. Plaintiffs may, for
example, all choose to sue in a state with tort policies relatively more
favorable to plaintiffs than defendants. The practical effect may be for
that one state's law to displace the law of other states in governing
human activity. If that state does not suffer the majority of the harmful
consequences of its own legislation, it may be able to recoup the benefits
of its policies by gaining compensation for its citizens injured in the
forum, while externalizing most of the costs of those policies on defend-
ants elsewhere. The forum court may not be in an ideal position to
determine the wisdom or justice of its law; it may not realize that its law
represents poor social policy because it has, perhaps unconsciously, suc-
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ceeded in externalizing most of the negative consequences of its
policies.3 0
Even if the race to the bottom actually turns out to be a race to the
top-imagine a relatively competitive market for state law3 1 -a rigid
forum law preference may still result in one state running the nation on
particular issues. Such a situation would be undemocratic to the extent
that it allowed one state to determine the internal policies of all others.
Complaints of imperial states that purport to govern activities centered
elsewhere are legion in conflicts scholarship. For example, some have
argued that Delaware has wrongly succeeded in setting corporate policy
for the entire nation.3 2 Similarly, others have criticized states like Mis-
sissippi and New Hampshire for imposing their tort law on the nation by
maintaining aberrational six-year statutes of limitation and procedural
classifications for such statutes.
3 3
Making the forum law presumption rebuttable, rather than rigid,
helps develop the debate about multistate policy in the appropriate
direction. For example, it encourages discussion of the appropriate lim-
its to defendant-versus plaintiff-protecting policies in torts and con-
tracts. This represents one of the major disagreements in conflicts law
and is an area in which some of the most fruitful discussion is currently
taking place. A rebuttable forum law presumption also focuses attention
on the substantive policies underlying the law, thereby increasing the
sophistication of debate about the wisdom and justice of substantive law.
Il. What Is Wrong with False Conflicts Analysis
False conflicts do exist. When two New Yorkers sign a construction con-
tract while on vacation in Miami which is to be performed in New York
and which violates no criminal or regulatory law of the state of Florida,
Florida has no legitimate interest in applying its law to determine
whether a valid contract was made. When a couple married in a state
with interspousal immunity moves to a state without such immunity, the
former state has no legitimate interest in applying its law in a lawsuit
between the parties arising out of an automobile accident occurring in
their new domicile, especially if insurance was purchased at the new
domicile.
3 4
At the same time, many courts and scholars have misused false con-
flicts analysis. This misuse is not a minor or infrequent occurrence; it
30. Michael McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to Products-Liability Reform, in
NEw DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAw 90-101 (W. Olson ed. 1988).
31. See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698 (1982).
32. Richard Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doc-
trine in Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 29 (1987).
33. Linda Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?! Federal Choice-of-
Law Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 103 (1981).
34. Tort immunity is not legitimately conceptualized as an implied condition of
the marriage arrangement.
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stems from the very genesis of interest analysis, as developed by Brai-
nerd Currie. From the beginning, false conflict analysis has exhibited
several major defects. First, it encourages gross oversimplification of
both the substantive policies underlying state law and the multistate pol-
icies involved in determining the appropriate geographic or territorial
scope of these state policies. Second, as Professor Lea Brilmayer has
argued, 35 it wrongly eschews consideration of individual rights, includ-
ing those underlying substantive state laws and multistate policy. Third,
it wrongly oversimplifies the problem of identifying the appropriate
baselines in multistate analysis. Fourth, it is misused in predictable ways
by the courts.
A. Oversimplification of Substantive and Multistate Policy
The methods used to create false conflicts often wrongly oversimplify
either substantive or multistate policies. One method for creating a pur-
ported false conflict is to define substantive policy in an overly narrow
fashion. For example, many interest analysts make a fundamental dis-
tinction between conduct-regulating and loss-allocating rules.3 6 "Con-
duct-regulating" rules are intended to affect behavior. "Loss-
allocating" rules are intended to place the losses occasioned by social
activity on the appropriate party even if those rules will leave unaffected
the intensity, frequency, or manner of the harmful activity. The distinc-
tion between conduct-regulating and loss-allocating rules allows the
analyst to create false conflicts. As Professor Robert Sedler has argued,
Depending on the policy reflected by a particular rule of law, a state's
interest in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in
that law may indeed be predicated on a party's residence in that state.
Tort rules imposing liability to implement compensatory policies or tort
rules protecting defendants from liability, and rules reflecting people-
protecting policies fall into this category [of loss-allocating policy]. A
state's interest in applying laws that reflect admonitory or regulatory poli-
cies, on the other hand, is predicated on a state's connection with the
conduct sought to be deterred or with the activity sought to be regulated
[conduct-regulating policy], and has nothing to do with a party's connec-
tion with the state.
3 7
This distinction fails to recognize that both conduct-regulating and loss-
allocating goals can be attributed to most, but not all, legal rules. More-
over, scholars disagree among themselves as to whether the goals of tort
and contract law, for example, should be geared to a post hoc determi-
nation of who should fairly bear the loss or an ex ante determination of
which rule creates the appropriate level of deterrence. Some law and
economics scholars argue, for example, that the only legitimate goal of
tort law is deterrence or setting appropriate incentives for efficient con-
35. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE LJ. 1277 (1989).
36. See, e.g., Robert Sedler, ProfessorJuenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach
to Choice-of-Law: An Appreciation and a Response, 23 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 865, 884 (1990).
37. Id.
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duct. Other scholars argue, equally vehemently, that the primary goal of
tort law is to require the defendant to compensate the plaintiff-either
because the defendant acted wrongfully or because of the moral princi-
ple that those who profit from an activity should bear its costs.
The difficulty of distinguishing between conduct-regulating and
loss-allocating rules can be seen in a case discussed by Professor Robert
Sedler. Fifty members of a Colorado club board a bus in Colorado
owned by a company that does most of its business in Colorado. They
travel to Arizona where the bus is involved in an accident. Colorado,
but not Arizona, limits recovery for noneconomic loss for ordiiary neg-
ligence to $250,000 for each plaintiff. Sedler argues that the case by the
Colorado plaintiffs against the Colorado bus company presents a false
conflict. "Colorado has a real interest in applying its law to limit the
liability of the Colorado defendant,"3 8 he argues. "However, Arizona
has no real interest in applying its law to allow recovery to the Colorado
plaintiffs, since the consequences of the accident and of allowing or
denying recovery will be felt by the plaintiffs in Colorado."
'39
This argument depends on the assumption that the Arizona policy
of full compensation is a loss-allocating policy rather than a conduct-
regulating policy. If this assumption is correct, it may be plausible to
argue that the effects of compensating or not compensating the plaintiffs
will be felt entirely in Colorado.40 However, there is no reason to
believe that the Arizona policy is not intended to affect behavior that has
foreseeable consequences in Arizona. It is often argued that tort liabil-
ity does not affect behavior in driving vehicles because fear of personal
injury provides all the deterrence that is needed. However, even if this
assertion is true, it does not follow that the Arizona statute has no effect
on behavior in this case. For example, it is entirely possible that the bus
company in Colorado would increase its investment in safety-either by
being more careful in hiring drivers or giving them more training or
supervision-if its expected liability were higher than the limits allowed
by the Colorado statute. Indeed, the Arizona statute providing for full
damages may be intended to achieve just this result. Arizona may be
interested in inducing nonresident companies to act more carefully
before they send buses into the state in order to protect the safety of all
citizens driving on Arizona roads.
A second method of creating false conflicts is to oversimplify the
legitimate geographic scope of state policy. In Sedler's bus example,
Arizona may be thought to be a disinterested state, not because its pol-
icy is loss-allocating, but because it is unlikely that its law will affect the
behavior of the defendant in Colorado. In that case, the deterrent pol-
38. Id. at 900.
39. Id.
40. At the same time, there may be effects inside Arizona of limiting liability, for
example, limiting the funds available to medical services and other creditors, and
wrongfully denying the nonresident plaintiffs the benefits of Arizona law which are
extended to other persons in the state.
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icy is directed only to Arizona bus companies, meaning those whose
principal place of business is in Arizona. As another example, in Schultz
v. Boy Scouts of America,41 the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that
New York tort law was unlikely to affect the behavior of the defendant
Boy Scouts of America because it was located in New Jersey. Yet New
York law may very well have been intended to give the nonresident
defendant an incentive to operate more carefully inside New York.
Moreover, such a policy might have a real effect in inducing the defend-
ant either to not send its troops into New York or to take greater care in
the selection or supervision of Scoutmasters. Similarly, the Arizona law
in Professor Sedler's example may be intended to induce nonresident
bus companies to take adequate care before sending untrained or care-
less drivers into Arizona, thereby endangering residents and nonresi-
dents on Arizona roads.
A third method of creating false conflicts is to define the potential
consequences of state law in an overly narrow fashion. In the bus hypo-
thetical, for example, Sedler argues that the "consequences of the acci-
dent and of allowing or denying recovery will be felt by the plaintiffs in
Colorado." 42 The impetus to find a false conflict leads Professor Sedler
to ignore the possible financial effect in Arizona. Professor Weintraub,
for example, argues that in such cases Arizona may have a potential
interest in an adequate fund to compensate local medical creditors.
43
This interest exists even if the Arizona policy is purely loss-allocating
and is not intended to have any effect on the defendant bus company's
conduct in either Colorado or Arizona.
My purpose here is not to argue that only one of several possible
formulations of state policy or state interest is correct and all others are
incorrect. Rather, the goal is to emphasize the complexity of these
determinations. This does not mean that it is impossible to make judg-
ments about the legitimate scope and definition of state interests.
Before making judgments of this sort, however, courts should generate
and compare competing interpretations of the range of state interests in
particular cases.
B. Inattention to Individual Rights
Another method of creating false conflicts is to oversimplify multistate
policy by focusing only on consequential analysis, and wrongfully ignor-
ing rights analysis. Sedler, like most interest analysts, focuses on the
places where the effects of compensating or not compensating will be
felt. In the bus example, he argues that if we assume Arizona policy is
not conduct-regulating, then all the consequences of compensating or
not compensating the parties will be felt in the place of their common
41. 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
42. Sedler, supra note 36, at 900.
43. R.WEINTRAUB, supra note 16, § 6.10, at 301-02.
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domicile. 4 4 Professor Brilmayer has correctly argued that this form of
analysis wrongly eschews consideration of individual rights.4 5 Rights
arguments are indeed relevant, not only to determination of the justice
or fairness of the underlying substantive tort law, but of the fairness of
the rules which implement multistate policy as well.
In the bus hypothetical, Sedler assumes that Arizona has no legiti-
mate interest in applying its tort law to adjudicate the allocation of loss
between nonresident Coloradans, just because the accident occurred
inside Arizona. This assumption oversimplifies the problem of deter-
mining whether it is fair to deny the plaintiffs the benefits of Arizona law
or, on the contrary, whether it would be unfair to deny the defendant
the protection of Colorado law.
On one hand, the defendant can argue that the problem of loss allo-
cation is one that implicates the relationship between the parties, rather
than their conduct. That relationship between the Colorado parties is
centered in Colorado. Colorado, therefore, is the state with the greatest
interest in determining the fair contours of the relationship between the
parties. Application of Arizona law would unfairly surprise the defend-
ant bus company, while at the same time giving the plaintiffs a windfall
because they did not rely on Arizona law in deciding to go there. Ari-
zona should refrain from applying its conception of justice as reflected
in its state law because to do so would unduly interfere with the ability of
the political community in Colorado to govern relationships centered
there.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs can argue that nonresidents, like
residents, have the right to the protection of Arizona law while in Ari-
zona. It would be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the
laws, as well as a denial of privileges and immunities, for Arizona police
to fail to protect nonresidents who come to Arizona. Arizona's tort pol-
icy is, in effect, a backup rule that applies when its police protection has
failed. There can be no unfair surprise to the defendant that its actions
in Arizona are governed by Arizona law, or that its conduct in training
and supervising its drivers in Colorado can be governed by Arizona law
when it chooses to send its drivers to do business inside Arizona by trav-
eling on Arizona roads and endangering Arizonan lives.
It is not immediately apparent which of these formulations is the
right one. Perhaps they are both misguided. The point is that false con-
flict analysis wrongly blocks these arguments from even being
considered.
44. Sedler, supra note 36, at 900 (arguing that Arizona has no real interest in
applying its law to allow recovery to the Colorado plaintiffs, since the consequences
of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery will be felt by the plaintiffs and
the defendant in Colorado).
45. L. BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 191-
230 (1991); Brilmayer, supra note 35, at 1277.
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C. Inattention to Baseline Problems
A final method of creating false conflicts is to fail to recognize the prob-
lem of identifying the appropriate baseline for analysis. In Grant v.
McAuliffe, 4 6 the court faced the question of whether a negligence claim
arising out of an Arizona accident, involving parties domiciled in Cali-
fornia, survived the death of the tortfeasor and could be assessed against
the tortfeasor's estate being administered in California. California, but
not Arizona, provided for the survival of tort claims.
Currie discussed a variant of this case in which the plaintiff victim
was domiciled in Arizona and the defendant tortfeasor was domiciled in
California. Many interest analysts see this as an unprovided-for case for
the following reasons. Both the survival doctrine and negligence liabil-
ity in automobile accident cases are thought to be loss-allocating regard-
less of their outcome. Because they have no effect on conduct, neither
state is interested in applying their respective laws to affect behavior. If
these rules are merely loss-allocating, then neither state is thought to be
interested in applying its law. California has no interest in imposing lia-
bility because the injured victim is not a California resident and the acci-
dent did not happen in California. Moreover, California does not
purport to apply California regulatory laws to conduct in Arizona that
has no injurious effects inside California. Arizona has no interest in pro-
tecting the defendant from liability since the defendant is not an Arizona
resident and the consequences of imposing liability will be felt solely in
California.
4 7
Professor Kramer criticizes this analysis and presents an ingenious
alternative.48 He agrees that Arizona has no interest in applying its non-
survival rule to benefit the family of a California tortfeasor. On the
other hand, this does not mean that Arizona tort law is completely inap-
posite. The death of the tortfeasor and the lack of survival of the tort
claim constitute a defense to the negligence claim which is legitimately
based on Arizona law. The fact that Arizona has no interest in applying
its defense to this case does not mean that it has no interest in applying
its negligence law to grant the plaintiff a claim for compensation for the
defendant's negligent conduct inside Arizona. This analysis uses depe-
qage to disentangle claims and defenses; the lack of interest in extending
the Arizona defense to the California defendant does not imply or entail
a lack of interest in granting the plaintiff a claim. According to Kramer,
Arizona is interested in applying its tort law to provide a remedy for
negligence on Arizona roads, especially if the victim is an Arizona resi-
dent. In contrast, California has no right to attempt to regulate the con-
46. 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
47. Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 229 (1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 152,
cited in Larry Kramer, The Myth of the Unprovided-For Case, 75 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1050
(1989).
48. Kramer, supra note 47, at 1050-55.
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duct of Californians on Arizona roads; California has no interest in
applying its negligence law to conduct inside Arizona.
This analysis raises several interesting questions. First, Kramer
redefines the state interests involved in the case and combines them with
analysis of rights to the protection of specific state laws. Contrary to the
prevailing formulation, Kramer argues that the case does not present an
unprovided-for case with neither state interested in applying its law.
Rather, it presents a false conflict because Arizona is interested and Cali-
fornia is not. He successfully demonstrates an alternative interpretation
of the nature and scope of state and individual interests involved in the
case. However, his analysis falls short in too quickly answering the ques-
tion of what each state's interests are. Given the conflict between his
interpretation and the traditional interpretation, it seems apparent that
further discussion is needed about which of the competing interpreta-
tions is best as a matter of justice and social policy.
False conflict analysis presumes that it is possible to identify limits
to state and personal interests in a relatively non-controversial fashion.
I am not convinced that this is possible. On the contrary, I believe that
it is almost always possible to reinterpret interests so as to create a real
question about the proper and just resolution of the choice-of-law deci-
sion. Unless courts consider the alternative perspectives implicated by
each case, they will not reach reasonable decisions. For example, it is
possible to accept the distinction Kramer makes between claims and
defenses, but nonetheless interpret the case as legitimately governed by
California, rather than Arizona, law. Thus, contrary to Kramer's analy-
sis, 4 9 the California defendant's estate may argue that Arizona may
indeed have a legitimate interest in applying its non-survival rule to pro-
tect a California family from liability for conduct of their deceased family
member inside Arizona. The California estate can argue that Arizona
law limits liability for negligent accidents occurring in Arizona to seizure
of the tortfeasor's assets; once the tortfeasor dies, the claim lapses. Tort
suits are brought against the wrongdoer alone, not against the wrong-
doer's family.5 0 If the tortfeasor has died, he can no longer be pun-
ished, and the sin does not descend to his relatives. There is no reason
why the Arizona legislature should make an exception to this principle
just because the tortfeasor is from California. The liability imposed by
Arizona law simply does not extend to the deceased tortfeasor's family.
Such an interpretation of Arizona's substantive and multistate policy
may have the benefit of extending to nonresident families the same pro-
tection extended to the families of resident tortfeasors. It interprets Ari-
zona law as simply not creating a claim upon which relief can be granted.
49. Id. at 1053.
50. It is true that a successful claim against the tortfeasor, resulting in a judg-
ment, will affect the financial interests of the tortfeasor's family who relies on him.
Nonetheless, the lawmakers in Arizona may believe that it is immoral to impose this
cost directly on the family when the wrongdoer is no longer around to suffer from the
consequences of his actions.
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On the other hand, the Arizona plaintiff may argue that the California
forum may have a legitimate interest in applying its tort law to an acci-
dent between a California resident and an Arizona resident in Arizona.
Although the California legislature would not ordinarily attempt to reg-
ulate the conduct of its residents anywhere in the world, it may be inter-
ested in imposing its norms ofjustice if they will not offend the policy of
any other state and if this result will not unfairly surprise a California
resident who reasonably relied on the law of another state in fashioning
his conduct. If one goal of California tort law is to determine, as a mat-
ter of justice and fairness, which party should bear the loss in an auto-
mobile accident, then the central issue is the just contours of the
relationship between the parties. This is especially true if tort law in
automobile crash cases is thought to be loss-allocating rather than con-
duct-regulating. The relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is
not fixed for all time at the moment of the crash. Rather, the failure of
the tortfeasor to compensate the plaintiff is a continuing failure. If that
failure to compensate is unjust, then it is a continuing injustice inside
California. If California law sanctions this result, it is allowing a Califor-
nia defendant to get away with murder (so to speak).51 When doing so
furthers no real interest of Arizona, it is unclear why California should
immunize its resident defendant and leave the plaintiff without a rem-
edy.52 In this case, application of California law will not interfere with
any legitimate interests of Arizona. Arizona law is meant to protect the
property of innocent family members of deceased tortfeasors; however,
the tortfeasor's family is not an Arizona family. Moreover, California
law embraces the principle that as between the innocent family members
of the tortfeasor who had vague hopes of inheritance and the wronged
victim, the victim should prevail. Nor will this result cause any unfair
surprise to the deceased tortfeasor and his family; he did not rely on the
Arizona survival statute in deciding how to act inside Arizona.
These varying interpretations of state substantive and multistate
policy present different pictures of the relations among the parties and
the states connected with the case. We cannot intelligently choose a
particular construction of state and party interests without considering
this range of interpretations.
A second interesting implication of Kramer's analysis is that he
illustrates the importance of identifying appropriate baselines for analy-
sis in conflicts cases. Kramer suggests that California has no legitimate
interest in regulating the conduct of Californian drivers on Arizona
roads. This principle has the foreseeable result of denying the plaintiff a
remedy unless the plaintiff can show a right to recover under the law of
the place of the injury. By withholding from the victim the protection of
plaintiff-protecting forum law, Kramer's baseline protects the defendant
from liability. On the other hand, Kramer identifies an applicable plain-
51. Weinberg, Conflicts Law and the Problem of Relevant Time: A Response to the Hague
Symposium, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1023 (1982).
52. B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 153-54.
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tiff-protecting policy of the place of the accident in his Grant v. McAuliffe
variation. But in the absence of such a policy, under his analysis, the
plaintiff would lose.
Erwin v. Thomas53 involved an accident in Washington between a
driver from Washington State and a defendant from Oregon. The vic-
tim's wife sued the defendant in Oregon for loss of consortium. Ore-
gon, but not Washington, allowed recovery for loss of consortium.
Kramer argues that the plaintiff has no right to recover for loss of con-
sortium because no state gives her a cause of action.54 Her home state
of Washington gives her no right to recover for loss of consortium; it
does not recognize this as a legally protected interest for which compen-
sation can be given. Oregon recognizes the legally protected interest,
but it can reasonably extend that interest only to Oregon domiciliaries,
or perhaps to nonresidents injured inside Oregon. Thus no state grants
her a cause of action. Case dismissed.
This is an interesting and creative approach to unprovided-for
cases, but the issue is not so simple. Kramer's definition of state inter-
ests adopts an implicit defendant-protecting baseline; the plaintiff loses
if she cannot identify some law that affirmatively grants her relief.
Although I agree with this general statement of the legal principle, I
believe that it is a conceptual trick to maintain that no state's law grants
the plaintiff in Erwin v. Thomas a cause of action. It is possible to con-
struct an alternative interpretation of the principle that the plaintiff must
point to some law granting her relief that is relatively more plaintiff-
protecting than Kramer's interpretation. Courts must face the choice
between these alternative baselines, as well as any other baselines that
may be proposed.
Washington, the place of the injury, like the forum in Oregon,
requires the negligent defendant to compensate those proximately
injured by his conduct. It is true that Washington does not recognize
the injury to the plaintiff. What would have happened if the plaintiff had
brought the case in a Washington court? On the one hand, the forum
might simply have applied forum law, denying plaintiff a remedy based
on the law of the forum, which was also the place of the accident. On
the other hand, it might have reexamined forum law, which was embod-
ied in a prior court decision and not based on a statute, 55 and consid-
ered the wisdom of denying a remedy for loss of consortium. After all,
the common law originally provided a remedy for loss of consortium for
men, but not for women,56 and the 1953 Washington Supreme Court
opinion cited by the Erwin court in 1973 uncritically adopted the com-
mon law policy. A Washington court might instead have reconsidered
53. 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
54. Kramer, supra note 47, at 1060-63.
55. Erwin, 264 Or. at 455, 506 P.2d at 495; see Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43
Wash.2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (Wash. 1953).
56. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN DOBBS, ROBERT KEETON & DAVID OWEN, PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 931 (1984).
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the policy basis for denying a remedy to the wife. It might have con-
cluded, as the majority of states today hold,5 7 that the harm to the rela-
tionship between the victim and his wife-depriving her of some of the
benefits of his companionship-constituted a real injury. In other
words, the Washington court might have modernized its law, thereby
granting the plaintiff a remedy and removing the conflict of laws. In
fact, the Washington common law rule, allowing a remedy for loss of
consortium for husbands but not for wives, was overruled seven years
after Erwin in an opinion in which the court noted that "[t]he common-
law distinction between husband and wife in regard to consortium is...
based upon an unreasonable, discredited concept of the subservience of
the wife to her husband" and would violate the equal protection
clause.
5 8
If, however, forum law had been embodied in a clear (and constitu-
tional) statute, or the Washington court was not ready to change forum
law, the court would probably have applied forum law on the grounds
that the Oregon defendant did not carry the disabilities and obligations
of Oregon law with him when he traveled to Washington and had the
same right to immunity from suit for this type of claim as any Washing-
ton resident driving in Washington. 59 The policy of multistate justice,
or nondiscrimination against a nonresident defendant in Washington,
might support extending the protection of forum law to the defendant.
The Washington court might therefore have seen the case as involving
the right of the defendant to the same protections accorded by Washing-
ton law as are given to other defendants who negligently cause injury
inside Washington. Although aberrational, it may be appropriate for
the Washington court to apply its old-fashioned law to benefit a nonresi-
dent when the only person harmed by such a result is a Washington
resident who is not entitled to relief under the law of her domicile. The
argument for Washington law is fairly strong.
At the same time, it is possible to imagine an argument that applica-
tion of Oregon law would not be unfair to the defendant. After all, he
did not plan his activities in Washington based on the limits on liability
there; indeed, he understood that his negligent conduct in Washington
could subject him to heavy damages. To impose Oregon law on him
would differentiate him from Washington residents who injure others
inside Washington, yet the different treatment may be justified in the
sense that the legislature in his home state would consider this result
fair. While one does not ordinarily imagine Oregon attempting to regu-
late an Oregon resident's conduct inside Washington, that may be the
wrong way to explain what is going on. Rather, one might note that
57. Id. at 932.
58. Lundgren v. Whitneys, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980)
(quoting Leffler v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App. 2d 67, 69, 239 N.E. 235, 236 (1968)).
59. But see Weinberg, supra note 6, at 595 (arguing that the higher liability stand-
ard of a plaintiff's home state law might apply to govern the behavior of a defendant
acting at home.)
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both Oregon and Washington provide heavy legal sanctions for negli-
gent operation of an automobile. The failure of the Oregon resident to
compensate the Washington wife is a continuing failure. The defendant
will consume resources inside the state of Oregon which might other-
wise have gone to compensate the injured Washington wife. Is the state
of Oregon interested in protecting its resident's assets from the just
claims of a victim whose injuries are recognized under the law of Ore-
gon, and of the majority of states? Perhaps not.
But suppose that the Washington court would still apply Washing-
ton law and deny the remedy. Must an Oregon court do the same thing?
It is not at all clear that it should. Consider the case as viewed by an
Oregon court. Application of Oregon law would not unfairly surprise
the defendant, who did not rely on the lack of a claim for loss of consor-
tium for women in deciding to drive to Washington. He may claim a
right to the protections of Washington law while he is there, and he may
claim that it would be discriminatory to deny him this protection. On
the other hand, the plaintiff also can make some rights arguments. She
was wronged by the defendant; the law of the forum-which is the
defendant's residence-recognizes this fact, although her own domicile
might not. The forum in Oregon might consider the fact that, if the case
were heard in Washington, the Washington court might very well take
that opportunity to jettison its aberrational rule, modernize its law, and
grant the wife a claim. Why should the Oregon court deny a remedy
which is sanctioned under forum law if Washington would provide a
remedy?
Even if the Oregon court believed that the Washington court would
keep its old rule and apply it to deny the wife a remedy, this does not
mean that the Oregon court must follow suit. From the standpoint of
the Oregon court, the case involves a resident defendant who negli-
gently injured a nonresident plaintiff in her home state. Although the
plaintiff's domicile does not recognize her injury, the forum in Oregon
does. To allow her to go uncompensated is to perpetuate an injustice; it
is to allow the defendant, a resident of the forum, to continue living in
Oregon without having compensated the victim of his wrongful conduct.
If the plaintiff had been an Oregon resident injured in Washington by
the Oregon defendant, the plaintiff would have prevailed in the Oregon
lawsuit; that would be a common domicile case. Since the case concerns
a loss-allocating rule, the law of the common domicile would almost cer-
tainly control. Moreover, if the plaintiff had been a man instead of a
woman, she would have prevailed under either Washington or Oregon
law. Why should the Oregon court deny a remedy to the Washington
plaintiff merely because she is a nonresident and a woman? This result
would countenance a continuing injustice against the plaintiff, as well as
arguably discriminatory treatment. Although the defendant claims a
right to be treated like a Washington defendant who injured someone
on the roads in Washington, the plaintiff claims a right to the same com-
pensation that would be granted to an Oregon plaintiff, or to a male
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Washington plaintiff for an accident with an Oregon defendant in the
State of Washington. As between the injured Washington wife and the
negligent defendant, whose rights should prevail?
This version of the multistate policies turns Kramer's analysis on its
head. He asks whether any state gives the plaintiff a cause of action. My
proposed analysis recognizes that each state requires the defendant to
compensate those proximately injured by the defendant's conduct and
then asks whether either state grants the defendant a defense to this
prima facie claim. The answer to this question may well be "no." Oregon
is not interested in protecting its own domiciliary from what Oregon
sees as the natural consequences of his negligent conduct; that would be
to countenance a continuing injustice inside Oregon. Oregon also is
interested in avoiding sex discrimination; it may be unwilling to apply
Washington law that denies plaintiff a remedy solely on the basis of her
sex. Washington may be interested in granting the defendant the same
immunity from liability to a Washington victim that would be extended
to a Washington defendant. On the other hand, the Oregon defendant
in an Oregon court is differently situated than an Oregon defendant in a
Washington court. The nonresident woman has the right to be treated
equally by the forum, even though her own courts would deny her
equality. The Washington policy discriminates on the basis of sex and
arguably violates the fundamental public policy of the forum. Nor did it
have long to last-seven years later, Washington changed its law. The
nonresident plaintiff may also claim the same rights as an Oregon plain-
tiff injured by an Oregon defendant in Washington. It may therefore be
just for forum law to determine the existence of a legal claim since the
forum is interested in altruistically extending its law to protect the inter-
ests of a nonresident-granting the nonresident the same rights that
would be conferred upon an Oregon resident injured by the defendant
in Washington-rather than dismissing the lawsuit on the grounds that
the plaintiff is not a resident of the forum. This argument is a strong
one if Washington has no affirmative interest in denying her a remedy,
as long as the defendant is a nonresident.
My point is not to prove that this analysis is the only one possible or
right way to resolve the dispute-quite the contrary. It is useful to rec-
ognize competing interpretations in analyzing conflicts cases. These
multiple versions of state and individual interests, individual rights to
protection of state law, and rights to nondiscrimination in multistate
cases demonstrate that, in adjudicating choice-of-law cases, the courts
could adopt relatively more plaintiff-protecting multistate policies or
defendant-protecting multistate policies. Courts will make better deci-
sions if they recognize these competing interpretations and then present
reasons for adopting one baseline over the other.
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D. How Interest Analysis Is Misused by Courts
1. The Case of the Missing Airline
A final problem with false conflicts analysis is that it is often misused by
the courts. The impetus to resolve cases by finding false conflicts
encourages courts to engage in one-sided analysis of choice-of-law
cases. In the well-known 1985 case of Bryant v. Silverman,60 the Arizona
Supreme Court applied the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws to
determine the law applicable to an airplane crash in Colorado. The rea-
soning in the opinion contains some common-and disastrous-mis-
takes. Moreover, the mistakes are not random. Rather, many are the
predictable consequence of a form of interest analysis that rests on the
search for false conflicts. 6 1 The case involved a wrongful death claim
against an airline company, Sun West Airlines, arising out of an airplane
trip that departed from New Mexico and crashed in Colorado, the desti-
nation state, killing several passengers. Sun West, the defendant airline,
had its principal place of business in Arizona, but serviced cities in New
Mexico and Colorado as well. The plaintiff, Barbara Bryant, was the
beneficiary of her husband, Paul Bryant, one of the passengers killed in
the crash. The Bryants were both domiciled in Arizona at the time of
the crash, as was Barbara Bryant at the time of trial. 62 The victim, Paul
Bryant, had purchased his ticket in Colorado, the place of the crash.
The plaintiff alleged that the crash was caused both by the pilot's negli-
gent operation of the plane in Colorado, where it crashed, and by the
defendant airline's negligent failure to provide adequate training to the
pilots at its principal place of business in Arizona.
The choice-of-law issue concerned the measurement of damages.
Arizona, the forum and the place of what the court characterized as the
parties' common domicile, allowed compensatory damages for non-
pecuniary losses (such as loss of consortium or pain and suffering) and
also allowed punitive damages. Colorado, the place where the crash
occurred and the ticket was purchased, limited damages to pecuniary
losses and did not allow punitive damages.
60. 146 Ariz. 41, 703 P.2d 1190 (1985).
61. The Arizona Supreme Court actually applied the most significant relationship
test of the Second Restatement, rather than interest analysis. However, it interpreted
the Second Restatement in a way that effectively incorporated interest analysis
through Section 6, which requires courts to determine the policies underlying the
substantive laws at issue and to judge their relative significance in the case. Other
states that have adopted the Second Restatement adopt other approaches-some
focus on the presumptive rules, others adopt a center of gravity principle, and still
others adopt a kind of better law approach. As Larry Kramer notes, the Second
Restatement is all things to all courts. (Correspondence, November, 1990).
62. There were two other wrongful death claims in the case filed on behalf of two
other victims. At the time of the crash, Mary Peters was domiciled in New Mexico
and Joyce Branham was domiciled in Texas. Since all plaintiffs asked the court to
apply Arizona law and the defendant asked the court to apply Colorado law, the court
refused to consider the interests of New Mexico or Texas. Biyant, 146 Ariz. at 42,
703 P.2d at 1191.
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The Second Restatement requires the court to consider the signifi-
cance of various contacts based on the policy considerations underlying
conflicts law. Section 6 of the Restatement lists the factors to be consid-
ered in choosing the applicable law, including the policies underlying
the laws of the two states, the justified expectations of the parties, and
comity concerns about the appropriate relations between overlapping
political communities. Section 145 lists the contacts generally thought
to be relevant to torts cases, including the domicile of the parties
(including a company's principal place of business), the place of the tor-
tious conduct, the place of the injury, and the place where the relation-
ship, if any, between the parties, is centered.
6 3
The court made several serious errors in applying this modern pol-
icy-oriented analysis. These errors include (1) analyzing contacts before
analyzing the substantive policies underlying the laws of the two states;
(2) engaging in one-sided analysis by failing to recognize the legitimate
policy concerns of Colorado and the justified expectations of the
defendant airline; (3) confusing arguments about state interests with
arguments about justified expectations and comity concerns; and (4) for-
malistic characterization of the issue as involving the law of torts, ignor-
ing the relevant contractual policies clearly present in the case.
The overall effect of these mistakes was to present an inaccurate
picture of both state interests and the justified expectations of the par-
ties. The court egregiously misrepresented the legitimate policy con-
cerns of the state whose law favored the defendant. The case presented
a real conflict, but the court's analysis made it appear as if both states'
interests would be furthered by application of Arizona's plaintiff-favor-
ing law. The court also failed to note the reasons why the defendant
might legitimately claim protection under the law of the defendant-pro-
tecting state of Colorado. The court's methodology thus had a signifi-
cant consequence: the concerns and legitimate claims of the airline were
effectively rendered invisible. It may be the case that the interests of the
plaintiff and the regulatory concerns of the place of the parties' common
domicile should prevail over the interests of the defendant and the regu-
latory concerns of the place of the crash, but the court will never get to
make this determination if it willfully blinds itself to the interests on one
side of the dispute.
Moreover, it seems the court's failure to analyze adequately the
state and individual interests is related to false conflict analysis. False
conflict analysis gives the courts an impetus to resolve the case by find-
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971). The court
also noted the presumption in Section 175 that the place of the injury in wrongful
death cases has the most significant relationship with the case unless some other state
can be shown to have a more significant relationship. Like many courts applying the
Second Restatement, the court gave this presumption little weight because the pre-
sumption itself notes that it can be overcome if some other state has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the case. The court therefore has no choice but to apply the
most significant relationship test directly to choose the applicable law. What is more
puzzling is that the court gave so little attention to the contractual aspects of the case.
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ing a false conflict if they can; otherwise, the court will appear to be
trampling on the interests of one state or another. Since the court is
likely to choose forum law to resolve what it sees as a real conflict, it is
not only going to appear to be trampling on the interests of the foreign
jurisdiction, but may look both parochial (intolerant of the law of other
states) and imperial (wrongly attempting to regulate events centered
elsewhere). False conflict analysis, on the other hand, makes the prob-
lem appear to go away, thereby avoiding the problems just noted. This
set of incentives to search for false conflicts causes the courts both to
oversimplify the interests at stake in choice-of-law cases and to overlook
obvious interests which do exist.
2. How False Conflict Analysis Misled the Court
The first mistake made by the court was to address the relevant choice-
of-law factors in the wrong order. It wrongly analyzed the contacts in
the case before addressing the policies underlying the laws of the two
states. 64 This procedure is confused because we cannot judge the sig-
nificance of a particular contact unless we know the policies the state is
seeking to achieve. The significance of different contacts in particular
cases will differ depending on whether the place of the contact has a
plaintiff-protecting policy or a defendant-protecting policy. It is there-
fore critical to identify the policies underlying the laws of the two states
before considering the significance of specific contacts. Otherwise, the
court may wrongly attribute a plaintiff-favoring policy to the place of the
injury when, in fact, it has-relative to other interested states-a defend-
ant-protecting policy.
65
This mistake cannot be attributed to interest analysis generally, or
false conflict analysis in particular. All interest analysts insist on analysis
of the policies underlying state laws to determine whether the states are
interested in applying their law to the contacts in the case. If anything,
this mistake can be attributed to a misuse of the Second Restatement.
Some courts may misread Section 145 and analyze the contacts listed in
that section independently of the policies underlying the potentially
applicable state laws.
The court's second mistake was that its review of the substantive
policies underlying the conflicting laws was woefully one-sided. This
mistake can be attributed to false conflicts analysis. In addressing the
interests of the place of the injury, the only policy mentioned by the
court was the interest in compensation. 6 6 Since the plaintiff was not
domiciled in Colorado and there were no unpaid medical creditors
64. See 146 Ariz. at 44, 703 P.2d at 1193 ("Our analysis starts with the four con-
tacts specified in § 145(2) ...."); id. at 47, 703 P.2d at 1196 (later considering the
policies underlying Arizona and Colorado damages law).
65. That is precisely what happened in this case. In considering the interests of
the state where the injury occurred, the court discussed only the plaintiff-favoring
policy of compensation, when that state had a defendant-protecting policy.
66. 146 Ariz. at 43, 703 P.2d at 1194 ("Although Colorado is the state of injury,
the state where the injury occurs does not have a strong interest in compensation if
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there, the court concluded that the place of the injury had little interest
in applying its law of damages to the case.6 7 This argument assumes
that the only policies underlying tort law are plaintiff-favoring. But the
conflict in this case arose because the place of the injury had a defend-
ant-protecting policy, the purpose of which was to limit the liability of
companies doing business there. The court's description of the signifi-
cance of the place of the injury is therefore not only biased toward the
interests of plaintiffs, but also is an inaccurate description of the regula-
tory policies at stake in the case before it.
Although the court later acknowledged Colorado's interest in pro-
tecting defendants from ruinous liability,68 it asserted that this policy
applied only to Colorado corporations. Since the defendant had neither
incorporated nor placed its principal place of business in Colorado, the
Colorado protective policy did not apply. This is a flawed application of
interest analysis and leads to a false conflict. 69 It is true that Currie and
his followers tend to argue that state policies are intended to benefit
residents. 70 For instance, in the case of injured victims, Currie believes
the consequences of not providing compensation will be felt almost
entirely in the place of their domicile-injured plaintiffs who do not
recover may go on welfare at the taxpayer's expense. The domicile state
will therefore either be interested in compensation to avert this expense,
or will be willing to live with undercompensated plaintiffs as a way to
achieve other social goals such as promoting industry. On the other
hand, interest analysts like Weintraub argue that the place of the injury
has interests in compensating nonresidents to provide a fund from
which to compensate local medical creditors.
7 1
In the case of corporate defendants, it is unclear why a defendant-
protecting policy should apply only to businesses "domiciled" in Colo-
rado (either incorporated there or having their principal place of busi-
ness there). Contrary to the assertions of the court,72 the injury in this
case was not completely fortuitous-it is true that no one planned to
crash in Colorado, but it is also true that the injury arose out of the
defendant's business operations in Colorado. When an injury occurs in
a state with which the defendant has substantial business contacts, and
the injured plaintiff is a non-resident .... Compensation of an injured plaintiff is
primarily a concern of the state in which plaintiff is domiciled.").
67. Id. at 45 n.4, 703 P.2d at 1194 n.4.
68. Id. at 47, 703 P.2d at 1196.
69. SeeJack Goldsmith, Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations: The Unprincipled Use of
a Choice of Law Method, 98 YALE L.J. 597 (1989) (arguing that traditional ways of inter-
preting state interests fail to recognize legitimate state interests in regulating or ben-
efiting corporations who do business in a state, but are not incorporated nor have
their principal place of business there).
70. See Currie, supra note 2, at 85 (arguing that Massachusetts legislates for "Mas-
sachusetts women").
71. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 16, § 6.10, at 301.
72. Bryant, 146 Ariz. at 46, 703 P.2d at 1195 (The court stated that since airplane
accidents are not planned, arguments about predictability and justified expectations
are weak).
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the injury arises out of those contacts, there is every reason to believe
that the place of the injury may be interested in applying its defendant-
protecting policy to benefit the defendant.
It may be the case that the plaintiff-protecting policy of the place of
the parties' common domicile, Arizona, should prevail over the policy of
the place of the injury. But the court never got to make this determina-
tion. It failed to do so, first, because it initially attributed only plaintiff-
protecting policies to the place of the injury, and second, because when
it did examine the defendant-protecting policies of the place of the
injury, it failed to recognize the applicability of the Colorado policy to
an injury arising out of the defendant's substantial business contacts
with Colorado.
The court's eagerness to find Colorado to be a disinterested state
caused it to overlook entirely the place of defendant's conduct. It did
so, presumably, because the defendant had acted, and was alleged to
have acted, in both Arizona and Colorado, and there was no way to
determine which place was more significant.73 But the fact that the
defendant acted in both states surely does not mean that the place of the
conduct has no significance-companies may expect their business activ-
ities in Colorado affecting Colorado to be governed by Colorado law,
whether or not they are also doing business in Arizona. Companies that
do business in many states do not thereby announce their willingness to
act everywhere under the standards of the most plaintiff-protecting state
with which they have contacts. It may be reasonable to charge them with
the plaintiff-protecting policy when they have acted in a plaintiff-protect-
ing state in a way connected with the case, but this does not mean that
their conduct in defendant-protecting states has no significance.
7 4
The court's third mistake was to confuse the analysis of state inter-
ests with analysis of the justified expectations of the parties and comity
concerns. The appropriate way to proceed is to identify the regulatory
and moral policies of the two affected states, and then to ask whether
those could appropriately apply to the case. After doing this-and only
afterwards-one can ask whether one of the states should engage in
restrained interpretation of its policy because the issue is legitimately
governed by the political community in the other state. Initially, the
court should be generous in describing the scope of state policies. In
this case, for example, the court should have concluded that Colorado
very well might be interested in applying its defendant-protecting policy
73. Id at 44-45, 703 P.2d at 1193-94.
74. Moreover, in addressing the interests of the place of the injury, the court
noted that the place of the injury has less ability to control behavior by deterrence or
punishment than the state where the defendant airline is domiciled or the state where
the misconduct occurred. 146 Ariz. at 45, 703 P.2d at 1194. The court fails to
acknowledge that the misconduct was alleged to have occurred in both Arizona and
Colorado. When misconduct occurs in the place of the injury, the place of the injury
is less fortuitous than when the injury occurs in a state unconnected with the defend-
ant's conduct. See D. CAvERS, supra note 16, at 146 (arguing for application of the
defendant-protecting law of the place where both the conduct and injury occurred).
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to save a corporation doing substantial business in Colorado from ruin-
ous liability for an accident arising out of its operations in the state.
Imposition of liability may push the airline into bankruptcy or cause it to
cut back services, and this would affect both employment and the econ-
omy generally inside Colorado. The idea that Colorado is only inter-
ested in protecting businesses that have their principal place of business
in Colorado is fanciful; in this day and age when many corporations do
business in many states, there will often be more than one state inter-
ested in regulating their activity. Only after identifying this interest
should the court ask whether, in the context of this multistate case, Col-
orado would or should engage in restrained interpretation of its law in
deference to Arizona's plaintiff-protecting policies. Colorado might do
so either to protect the justified expectations of the plaintiff who relied
on the law of her domicile or because application of Colorado law would
substantially interfere in the ability of the political community in Arizona
to govern legal relations among its domiciliaries, and Arizona's interests
in the case therefore outweighed Colorado's interests.
The Arizona court's eagerness to find a false conflict induced it to
overlook the possible regulatory and moral interests of both the defen-
dant and the state where the injury occurred. In contrast, an analysis
that encouraged recognition of the competing interests of both the par-
ties and the affected states would avoid this mistake without preventing
the forum from applying forum law if it were appropriate to do so.
Finally, the court erred by formalistically characterizing the case as a
torts case, ignoring the potential contractual policies implicated in the
dispute. It asserted that the case involved liability for tortious conduct
arising out of the contractual relationship, rather than "the terms of the
contract."'75 This assumes that contract law involves ascertaining the will
of the parties and tort law involves coercive state regulation of private
conduct for social ends. Yet it would be perfectly appropriate to view
the wrongful death statute as an implied term in the contract made when
the ticket was purchased in Colorado. Contracts do not only implement
the will of the parties, but are heavily regulated; those regulations effec-
tively become part of the relationship established by the parties. It may
be that Arizona should refuse to defer to the law of the place where the
contract was made, either because it was an adhesion contract, or
because the terms were fundamentally unfair or because its own inter-
ests in regulating the relationship between the parties take precedence.
Nonetheless, it is implausible to claim that the place where the parties
enter a contractual relationship and where performance is due has no
interest in regulating their relationship. 76 The court's eagerness to find
75. Bryant, 146 Ariz. at 46, 703 P.2d at 1195.
76. Currie argued that the place where the contract was made was arbitrary
because contract law was meant to protect the parties. Thus, a Massachusetts woman
should not be able to contract with a Massachusetts company in Maine and thereby
avoid the Massachusetts protective contract-regulating policy. However, this does
not mean that the place of the contract was completely irrelevant. Currie later
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a false conflict was a contributing factor in inducing the court to over-
look the legitimate interests of Colorado in regulating the contractual
relationship initially established there. Real conflicts analysis would
allow recognition of these potential interests, while allowing the forum
to explain why it may have been appropriate for Colorado to defer to
Arizona law.
3. How False Conflict Analysis Is Misused in Contracts Cases
False conflicts analysis is sometimes misused by the courts in contracts
cases, as well as torts cases. For example, in Intercontinental Planning, Ltd.
v. Daystrom, Inc.,77 the plaintiff, a New York corporation, alleged that the
defendant, a New Jersey corporation, had made a written promise in
New York to pay the plaintiff a finder's fee if it merged with a company
identified by the plaintiff. When the first deal did not work out, plaintiff
found a second company for the defendant, which orally promised to
modify the written contract to include the second company. The
defendant's oral promise was made at a meeting at the defendant's
offices in New Jersey. The plaintiff's business was centered in New York
and suit was brought there. The contract was enforceable under New
Jersey law, but not under New York's statute of frauds.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the case presented a false
conflict. 78 According to the court, New York was interested in applying
its statute of frauds to a transaction between a New York finder and a
NewJersey promisor. New York law was intended to protect defendants
from fraudulent claims for commissions on services rendered by brokers
in the sale of businesses. "This policy would include foreign principals
who utilize New York brokers or finders because . . . New York is a
national and international center for the purchase and sale of businesses
and interests therein." 79 The court went on to note that New York law
is "intended to protect not only its own residents, but also those who
come into New York and take advantage of our position as an interna-
tional clearing house and market place." 80 New Jersey, on the other
hand, had "no interest in having its lack of protection for its residents
used to establish their liability in a suit brought by residents of other
jurisdictions when the laws of the forum State offer a complete defense
to the action."8 1 In other words, according to the New York court, New
Jersey would not intend to impose a $2,781,848 judgment against a New
Jersey company to benefit a New York resident when the New York resi-
argued that the forum should engage in restrained interpretation of forum law if the
contract is made in another jurisdiction and it would unfairly surprise one of the
parties to apply the law of the forum. Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28
LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 754, 757 (1963).
77. 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576 (1969).
78. Id. at 385, 248 N.E. 2d at 584.
79. Id. at 383, 248 N.E.2d at 582.
80. Id. at 383-84, 248 N.E.2d at 583.
81. Id. at 385, 248 N.E.2d at 584.
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dent violated New York law in a way that would deny him a remedy
under the law of his home state.
The case is not so easy. In Bushkin Associates, Inc. v. Raytheon,8 2 a
Massachusetts company made an oral promise by telephone to a New
York broker. Just as in Daystrom, the New York statute of frauds denied
the broker a claim while Massachusetts law would enforce the promise.
The Massachusetts court rejected the idea that Massachusetts was unin-
terested in imposing a monetary obligation on a resident for the benefit
of a New Yorker who had failed to comply with the regulatory require-
ments of the law of his domicile. Rather, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court applied Massachusetts law to enforce the promise.
Although the Massachusetts court did not find the case to present a
false conflict, it used arguments reminiscent of false conflicts to make
the difference between the two laws seem less significant. For example,
it argued that both states shared interests in "enforcement of con-
tracts."8 3 The states merely differed on the best way to protect this
shared interest. Further, the court noted that consideration of "thejus-
tified expectations of the parties... militates for Massachusetts law."
8 4
These characterizations of Massachusetts and New York policy misstate
the case; they fail to appreciate the real conflict between the policies of
the two states. To say that both states enforce contracts suggests that
the difference is merely one of detail, rather than basic principle. How-
ever, in almost any conflicts case, we can point to shared policies, such
as imposing liability for wrongful conduct and promoting a market sys-
tem. If we state policies at a sufficiently high level of generality, we can
always make it appear as if the states really agree on fundamentals.
However, it is extremely misleading to suggest that there is no real
conflict between the policies underlying the laws of the two states. New
York requires a writing to protect customers from fraudulent claims by
brokers. Massachusetts, on the other hand, is more worried about
fraudulent or quasi-fraudulent promises made by customers to brokers.
Allowing the Massachusetts company to take advantage of the New York
broker by obtaining information from him in reliance on its promise to
pay a large commission, and then reneging on the promise, would be to
countenance a fraud by the Massachusetts company on the New York
broker. Although both states are interested in preventing fraud, they
have quite different views about what kinds of actions are most likely to
raise dangers of this kind. Similarly, it is misleading to argue that
enforcing contracts obviously promotes justified expectations. It is true
that people ordinarily expect their promises to be enforced. Under New
York law, however, those expectations are notjustified unless they are in
writing.
82. 393 Mass. 622, 473 N.E.2d 662 (1985).
83. Id. at 634, 473 N.E.2d at 670.
84. Id. at 635, 473 N.E.2d at 670-71.
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In contrast to the suggestions by both the Massachusetts and New
York courts, cases of this kind present real conflicts. New York is inter-
ested in promoting New York as a center of international commerce by
regulating New York brokers so as to protect customers from fraudulent
claims by those brokers. Massachusetts, on the other hand, is interested
in promoting business contacts between nonresidents and Massachu-
setts residents by giving nonresidents the same protections afforded to
residents when they contract with Massachusetts companies. Thus, Mas-
sachusetts is interested in imposing a monetary judgment on its resident
defendant who orally promised inside Massachusetts to pay a commis-
sion to a nonresident. The nonresident who deals with a Massachusetts
resident in Massachusetts is entitled to the same protections as would be
afforded others contracting there.
The search for false conflicts led both the New York court and the
Massachusetts court down the wrong path. They each failed to appreci-
ate the strength of the individual interests on the other side of the case.
They also failed to appreciate sufficiently the legitimate regulatory inter-
ests of the state whose law was not applied. Courts will not be able to
promote justice between citizens of different states if they blind them-
selves to the real conflicts presented by these intractable cases.
Il. Real Conflicts Analysis
The following table illustrates some competing arguments for the plain-
tiff and defendant in Bryant v. Silverman as to whether the plaintiffs have
the right to damages for pain and suffering. The table begins by listing
the relevant contacts and the possible policies underlying the conflicting
laws of the two states. There may, of course, be additional policies rele-
vant to the analysis. It is then followed by arguments about the justified
expectations of the parties and the relative interests of the two states.
The arguments listed under the Arizona column are examples of those
that could be expected to be offered by the plaintiffs, and those under
the Colorado column are those that could be expected from the defend-
ant. An adequate analysis of the case requires a full development of
these competing perspectives.
Deciding the case requires exploration of whether it is possible to
generate a choice-of-law principle that would be acceptable to the courts
in both states and which would properly (1) balance the competing
interests of the plaintiff and defendant in relying on or claiming the pro-
tection of the laws of the different states; (2) determine whether the rela-
tionship between the parties was centered in one state and whether the
political community where the relationship is centered has a legitimate
claim to govern it without interference by other states; and (3) deter-
mine whether one of the laws is sufficiently archaic, isolated, unjust, or
unwise to be confined to domestic cases in the state that follows it. If
none of these criteria generate a choice-of-law rule, the case should be
resolved by application of forum law on the grounds that there is no
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reason for the forum to give up what it sees as the better law in defer-
ence to the just expectations of the defendant or in deference to the
norms of another political community. This result does encourage
forum shopping in those cases where choice-of-law principles do not
apply. However, forum shopping is less of an evil than the arbitrariness
or dishonesty that accompany rigid territorial rules combined with the
escape devices they inevitably generate. Nor do jurisdiction-selecting
territorial rules generate uniformity of results in conflicts cases; charac-
terization questions and escape devices effectively vitiate any possibility
that non-policy-oriented rules will be applied in a manner that creates
uniform results regardless of where the case is heard.
8 5
Moreover, we have reached this point because we have been unable
to generate a choice-of-law principle that would be acceptable to both of
the states. The problem of forum shopping arises not because of paro-
chial prejudice, but because we have a real conflict between the policies
of interested states. The existence of the real conflict means that it may
not always be possible to develop a choice-of-law principle that will be
convincing to the state whose law is not applied. After all, in the
absence of a conclusion that particular types of conduct or particular
relationships should be governed by the state's law with which they bear
a particular connection, choice-of-law principles necessarily privilege
certain substantive policies over others, either by calling those policies
"basic," by characterizing them as constituting the better law, or by giv-
ing one of the parties the option of choosing the law of one of the states.
But there is a real conflict precisely because the states disagree about
how to answer these questions. It is imperative that courts and com-
mentators face this truth, rather than attempt to suppress it.
85. Singer, Real Conflicts, supra note 18, at 6-33.
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Bryant v. Silverman
Arizona Colorado
Contacts 0 rr's domicile * destination
0 A's principal place of 9 place of injury/crash
business 9 possible site of A's
0 possible site of A's negligent conduct (in
negligent conduct operating the plane)
(mis-training pilot) 0 ticket purchased
. forum
Laws * -r has the right to recover 0 A is immune from claims
for nonpecuniary losses, for nonpecuniary damages,
including pain and including pain and
suffering suffering
Policies a full compensation for all 0 protect A from ruinous
injuries liability
a failure to compensate for * encourage business to
pain and suffering will operate in Colorado by
unjustly relieve the A of limiting liability for
the actual consequences of activities there, thereby
A's wrongful conduct creating jobs and helping
* full compensation is the local economy
necessary to internalize * prevent the jury from
the external effects of A's engaging in unfettered
wrongful conduct, thereby redistribution from As or
giving A proper incentives insurance companies to
to engage in the efficient sympathetic rrs




Justified * A did not plan for the * 'r voluntarily went to
expectations accident to happen in Colorado and accepts the
Colorado; since it could vulnerabilities, as well as
have happened in either the benefits, of Colorado
state, A cannot be unfairly law
surprised by application of 9 by going to Colorado, ir
Arizona law cannot be unfairly
* it has a right to the surprised that Colorado
protection of the law of law applies to an
her domicile, and would accident in Colorado
be surprised to learn * A justifiably expected
that her rights against Colorado law to apply
another domiciliary turn to its business activities
on the fortuity of where in Colorado, and would be
the accident occurred unfairly surprised to learn
that its activities there
were governed by Arizona
law
228 Vol 24
1991 Facing Real Conflicts
Interest
analysis
Arizona has strong interests in
applying its law
* The consequences of
undercompensating the ir
will be felt in Arizona at
therr's domicile
" Arizona is interested in full
compensation to provide
sufficient incentives to
induce its resident A to
invest in safety
* The relationship between
the parties is centered
in Arizona since it is
their common domicile;




Colorado has weak interests in
applying its law
* Colorado is not the A's
principal place of business;
since A's conduct is
centered in Arizona,
Colorado should engage in
restrained interpretation of
its policy and allow the
state of the common
domicile and A's principal
place of business to
determine both the proper
level of investment in
safety and the just amount
of compensation
* Application of Colorado
law will interfere too
much in the ability of
Arizona to regulate the
conduct of its resident
business
* Colorado has no right to
externalize the effects of its
business protection policies
to Arizona, where an
undercompensated ir
may need public assistance
Colorado has strong interests in
applying its law





this policy applies here
because A does substantial
business in Colorado and
because the accident arises
out of its business
contacts there
* Colorado is interested in
regulating the contract
entered into in Colorado
when -Tr's husband
purchased the ticket
Arizona has weak interests in
applying its law
* Application of Colorado
law will provide sufficient
incentives to invest in
safety since the A will not
be able to plan to have
accidents happen just in
Colorado; thus it faces the
possibility of full liability
under Arizona law if the
accident occurs there
* Arizona has no right to
externalize the effects of








its conduct in Colorado
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IV. Real Conflicts and the Problem of Power
Interest analysis is subject to criticism for urging courts to look for false
conflicts. Even if the results reached by interest analysts are often cor-
rect, it is wrong to reach those results by the fiction that many cases
present false conflicts. Rather, I suggest we must face the real conflicts
underlying contested choice-of-law cases and then justify the results we
reach with these real conflicts in mind. Thus, I see myself as a sympa-
thetic critic of interest analysis.
To resolve conflicts cases, I suggest attempting to generate choice-
of-law principles of the kind suggested by Larry Kramer, David Cavers,
and Russell Weintraub, and to resort to forum law where such principles
do not apply, as suggested by Louise Weinberg, Herma Hill Kay, and
Robert Sedler. Real conflicts analysis can help generate these principles
by clarifying the value choices implicated in adjudicating these cases.
Those value choices include (1) identifying which policies are sufficiently
archaic or unjust that they should be confined to purely domestic cases;
(2) identifying when actors have a right to rely on the law of particular
jurisdictions in planning their conduct; and (3) determining which kinds
of issues are so central to the norms of particular political communities
that those communities should have the right to determine the contours
of relationships centered there.
Real conflicts analysis may change the results reached in multistate
cases. Giving up the urge to find false conflicts wherever possible means
we may recognize state and individual interests that we had previously
ignored. Recognition of these interests may change how we evaluate
both the costs and benefits and the justice or injustice of applying the
conflicting laws.
Even if recognition of real conflicts does not change the result, it
helps to enable decisionmakers to confront the effects of their power. It
is wrong to make power too easy to exercise. I fear that false conflicts
analysis does just that-it relieves the decisionmaker of the need to con-
front the interests of the losing party. For this reason, I believe that
recognition of real conflicts is a prerequisite to the legitimate exercise of
power by courts.
As Martha Nussbaum has explained, many " 'solutions' [to practical
conflicts] do not really solve the problem. They simply underdescribe
or misdescribe it. They fail to observe things that are here to be seen:
the force of the losing claim, the demand of good character for remorse
and acknowledgement." 8 6 She concludes that "the only thing remotely
like a solution here is, in fact, to describe and see the conflict clearly and
to acknowledge that there is no way out .... ,8 7 Recognizing that there
is "no way out" does not mean that we throw up our hands. It means
decisionmakers must recognize real conflicts and make considered judg-
ments about them, generalizing and developing choice-of-law principles
86. M. NusSBAUM, supra note 1, at 49.
87. Id. at 40-50.
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where possible. False conflicts analysis does not help us do this. Itjust
gets in the way.
8 8
88. For further development of the conflicts analysis presented in this article, see
Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, supra note 18.

